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RightINCOME DISTRIBUTION AND MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
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The post-war growth experiences of developing countries lead to the idea that income
distribution may a#ect economic growth and cause multiple equilibria. In this paper, a
theoretical model is used to illustrate the possibility that equality makes a country human-
capital abundant, which enables industrialization and higher economic growth. On the other
hand, in unequal developing countries where the majority of the people manage to survive at
minimum consumption level, human capital investment such as schooling is not feasible. Such
countries become unskilled labor abundant and su#er further from low economic growth. In
addition, the two-good framework shows that protecting infant industries with dynamic
externality might enhance economic growth.
Key words: income distribution; economic growth; human capital; comparative advantage;
learning-by-doing.
JEL Classiﬁcation: O15, F11, O41
I. Introduction
Recently, it is often advocated that equal income distribution accelerates the economic
growth of developing countries. This argument is derived from empirical studies (Alesina and
Rodrik, 1991; Persson and Tabellini, 1992, 1994) and the rapid economic growth of the
relatively equal East Asian countries such as Japan and Taiwan (World Bank, 1993). Much
research e#ort has been devoted to further explain this issue (Partrigdge, 1997).
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) proposed a theoretical model based on the notion
that equality can enhance economic growth by enlarging the domestic demand for manufac-
tured goods. Alesina and Perotti (1993) explained this phenomenon using the positive e#ect of
equality on political stability. On the other hand, the theory of social choice of the voters was
adopted in the models by Alesina and Rodrick (1991), Perotti (1993) and Persson and
Tabellini (1992, 1994). Galor and Zeira (1993) suggested that equality enhances growth
 I am very grateful to Nancy Stokey, Kevin M. Murphy, Gary S. Becker, Motoshige Itoh, Colin R.
Mckenzie, Tsuneo Ishikawa, Kiyohiko Nishimura, and the seminar participants at the University of Tokyo for
their helpful comments and suggestions.
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics 44 (2003), pp.75-90.  Hitotsubashi Universitythrough rapid human capital accumulation. Owen and Weil (1998) theoretically analyzed how
di#erent initial wealth distributions can cause multiple equibria through liquidity constraints
on education.
This paper examines the e#ect of distribution on growth through human capital accumu-
lation on the lines of Galor and Zeira (1993). This paper, however, di#ers from other studies
in the sense that the employed model is a two-good growth model. This type of model
constitutes a framework that helps clarify the following two points in addition to the e#ect of
distribution on growth.
First, this model serves to explain that an economy generally experiences industrialization
from agricultural economy when it grows rapidly. Secondly, this model shows that protecting
infant industries with dynamic externality can enhance economic growth. Even when an
economy does not have comparative advantages in the manufacturing sector, protecting it can
accelerate its growth rate and raise the welfare of the economy.
The logic behind the above arguments is as follows. In an equal developing country, a
large segment of the population has access to education and the country becomes human-
capital abundant. Therefore, such a country has a comparative advantage in terms of the
production of human-capital intensive goods such as manufactured goods. As the production
of manufactured goods exhibits externality and raises the general productivity through
learning-by-doing, the country then experiences an increase in productivity and average
income. Higher incomes raise the educational level in the subsequent period, leading to
accelerated industrialization and economic growth (virtuous circle). On the other hand, in an
unequal economy, only a small number of wealthy people can a#ord education, which makes
the economy unskilled labor abundant. As a result, this type of economy specializes in the
production of agricultural goods, overall productivity stagnates and growth rate declines
(vicious circle). Therefore, an economy becomes industrialized as it grows, and protecting its
manufacturing sector enhances economic growth. The model described examines how income
distribution changes as the economy grows, and shows that distribution might change, as
described by the inverted-U hypothesis of Kuznets (1955).
The considered framework extends a basic trade model of a small open economy with two
goods and two factors in two aspects. First, the factor endowments are determined endoge-
nously, depending on income distribution. Secondly, the overlapping generations model and
endogenous growth theory are used to derive the model dynamic, in order to examine the
growth rate. The static equilibrium of the model is examined in section 2, and the dynamic
equilibrium in section 3. Section 4 examines the policy implications, and the ﬁnal section is
summary and conclusion.
II. The Static Equilibrium
A small country that trades two goods at exogenously given world prices is studied. The
goods are Z (agricultural goods) and M (manufactured goods), which are produced using two
factors: AtL( unskilled labor) and AtH (human capital). The factors are not traded, and At
denotes the productivity level of factors. Production technology exhibits constant returns to
scale and time-invariant. Manufactured goods are assumed to be relatively human-capital
intensive, while agricultural goods, unskilled labor-intensive. The economy produces both
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. These equilibria are examined in the following separate sections.
1. The case of incomplete specialization
In the case of incomplete specialization, the equilibrium can be illustrated by the following
three stages.
1.1 The determination of wage rates and input coe$cients
In the ﬁrst stage, incomplete specialization implies that the unit cost of each good must be
equal to its world price. Namely,
wHaHM(wH, wL)wLaLM(wH, wL)PM (1)
and
wHaHZ(wH, wL)wLaLZ(wH, wL)PZ,( 2 )
where PM and PZ are respectively the world price of goods M and Z, wH and wL are the rewards
F><.1
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. The production technology is described by these unit input coe$cients.
Given PM and PZ, these equations give the equilibrium wH, wL and ajj(wH, wL).
1.2 Utility maximization and determination of factor supplies
In the second stage, given the wage rates determined in the ﬁrst stage, altruistic
individuals maximize their utility by choosing their levels of consumption and the degree of
their children’s education, which subsequently determines the aggregate supply of human
capital. In each period t0, 1, 2, '', agents are born and live for two periods. Each agent
gains one child at the beginning of the second period, and therefore the population is constant.
In the ﬁrst period, individuals have no endowment of labor or goods. Their education is
ﬁnanced by their parents and they gain human capital. In the second period, they are endowed
with one unit of unskilled labor, and work by supplying their labor inelastically. They spend
their wage to consume and to educate their children. Some of the adults provide for the
education of their children as bequest, because agents are assumed to be altruistic and to care
also about their children’s income. Agents born in period t receive ht units of education and
gain f(ht) units of human capital. When they work in period t1, their productivity is At1
and they receive At1wL for their unskilled labor and At1wHf(ht) for their human capital.




Note that all individuals have the same potential ability and di#er only in their levels of
education.
Given the above income, agents choose the levels of their consumption of each good and
children’s education. First, consider the optimization of the share of cMt1 and cZt1 for a given
amount spent on consumption. The utility maximization problem is given by
cMt1, cZt1
max u(cMt1, cZt1)( 4 )
s.t. ct1PMcMt1PZcZt1.( 5 )
Denote the Marshallian demand functions of this problem as c* Mt1(PM, PZ, ct1)a n d
c* Zt1(PM, PZ, ct1). As PM and PZ are constant, c* Mt1 and c* Zt1 depend only on ct1. Therefore,
a Hicks’ composite good can be deﬁned as
PMc* Mt1(ct1)PZc* Zt1(ct1)
d ct1,( 6 )
which is called consumption thereafter and its price is one.
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from their children’s income, and a denotes the unit cost of education. Perfect foresight is
assumed concerning the level of At2 and individuals treat At2 as given.
The ﬁrst constraint is an ordinary budget constraint, and the second and third are the
non-negativity constraints on ht1 and ct1. It is assumed that u 0, u 0, u 0, v 0, v 0,
f 0, f 0.
Using Lagrange multiplier l and Kuhn-Tucker multipliers m and h, the ﬁrst-order
conditions of the above problem are given by the following equations and (8):
u (ct1)lt1ht1 (10)
v ()At2wHf (ht1)lt1amt1 (11)
mt10, ht10, mt1ht10 (12)
ht10, ct10, ht1ct10. (13)
As there are Kuhn-Tucker conditions, the solutions can be divided into a number of cases.
Assume, however, that the non-negativity constraint on consumption does not become binding
as long as the agents have positive income, because the agents need to consume something to
survive. Therefore it is not necessary to examine the case with ct10a n dmt10, and ct10
and mt10 is assumed in the rest of the paper. On the other hand, the non-negativity
constraint on educational level sometimes becomes binding and some very poor agents are
unable to provide an education to their children. Thus, solutions are divided into the two cases
with ht10a n dht10. Figure 2 gives the income-expansion path with such utility function.
















The level of income, At1
 yt1, which divides the two cases is given by the above equation for
a given At1. Then, when yt1
 yt1, the non-negativity constraint on education is not binding
and ht10, and when yt1
 yt1, it is binding and ht10. Note that
 yt1 rises if At1
increases.
In the ﬁrst case with ht10a n dmt10( yt1





















By di#erentiating the above equation, the comparative statics give the following results. When














As income increases, some fraction of it rises ct, and the rest rises ht. ht can converge to .
In the second case with ht10a n dmt10(yt1
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their consumption. In developing countries where the average income level is low, such
households constitute a considerable part of the economy.
The optimum choices for children’s education which satisfy the above ﬁrst-order condi-
tions are shown in ﬁgure 3 for a given At1. Notice that education reaches zero level at positive
yt1.
As shown above, the level of education of children is a function of the level of parental
income. Thus, in the whole economy, the pattern of income distribution determines the
aggregate level of education and human capital. As income is approximately distributed
lognormally, three density functions of lognormal distribution with di#erent variance and the
same mean are shown in ﬁgure 4. Figure 3 placed over ﬁgure 4 in di#erent positions resulted
in ﬁgure 5a and 5b. Figure 5a shows that the larger the inequality (variance s
2) is, the lower
the number of people who can receive education and the lower the economy’s level of human
capital, if average income is moderately low. In other words, in an equal developing country,
a large share of the population can receive education and the country becomes human-capital
abundant. On the other hand, in an unequal developing country, only a small number of people
can receive education and therefore it becomes low-skilled labor abundant.
In a country where average income is extremely low, however, the opposite is true (Figure
5b). If income is equally distributed, everyone is equally poor and unable to a#ord education.
If distribution is unequal, at least some of the agents can educate their children and therefore
the country gains some aggregate human capital.
Using the above relationship between income distribution and factor endowment, the
relationship between distribution of income and the pattern of production can be described. As
the considered economy is a developing country, assume that it either specializes in the
production of agricultural goods (Z) or produces both agricultural goods (Z) and manufac-
turing goods (M).
F><.4
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. This economy completely specializes in agriculture






































incompletely specializes in production. Namely, industrialization occurs in addition to agricul-
ture. Therefore, the case we are currently considering is that of a moderately equal country.
F><.5 a
F><.5 b
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H 2,In an extremely poor country, the opposite relationship between inequality and factor
ratio exists. Therefore, an unequal country has a better chance to succeed in industrialization.
1.3 The factor market equilibrium
In the third stage, given the factor supplies examined in the second stage, the amounts of




































Notice that the GNP level indicates the welfare level, because the considered economy is a
small country.
2. The case of complete specialization
If only a small number of people can receive education, the economy becomes unskilled
labor abundant. Such country completely specializes in the production of agricultural goods.








The GNP is given by
QtPZZt. (29)
2003] >C8DB: 9>HIG>7JI>DC 6C9 BJAI>EA: :FJ>A>7G>6 2-III. Dynamic Equilibrium
Now consider how the economy evolves dynamically. In a dynamic equilibrium, the
increase of Ht and the learning-by-doing of manufacturing goods production cause economic
growth. wH, wL, Ht, Mt, Zt and At are endogenously determined, while PM and PZ are
exogenously given.
1. The increase of Ht
First, examine the e#ects of the increase of aggregate human capital, Ht. As shown in the
previous section, adults determine their children’s educational level and income for given At1
and At2. As a result, the educational level in each dynasty changes and as does the aggregate
human capital. In order to illustrate the dynamic evolution of education and income through
time, the dynamics of yt based on ﬁgure 3 are presented in ﬁgure 6 for a given At1.A st h e
educational level corresponds to income level by one-to-one in this model, this ﬁgure represents
the evolution of educational level ht as well as yt.
Figure 6 depicts a case where the dynamics of yt intersect with the 45line at two points.
In this case, the descendants of wealthy individuals with incomes above y ˆreceive more and
more education and converge to the high-level equilibrium with income y*. On the other hand,
the descendants of poor agents with incomes below y ˆmay receive some education but converge
to the low level equilibrium with zero education and low income. In other words, all the
dynasties are concentrated in two groups, depending on the level of initial income.
2. The increase of productivity through learning-by-doing
Secondly, consider the e#ect of learning-by-doing. In a country where industrialization
occurs, learning-by-doing raises the factor productivity At and accelerates economic growth.
F><.6
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H 2.Namely, the cumulative amount of produced manufacturing goods raises the factor productiv-





f  0, f 0, lim
k t f  0, lim
k t fA A, wL c c
A A
. (31)
For the sake of discussion, assume that the knowledge accumulation of the manufacturing
sector completely spillovers to the agricultural sector and raises the factor productivity of that
sector at the same rate as that of the manufacturing sector. This case is analytically interesting
and is considered at length in this paper. A case of incomplete knowledge spillover is brieﬂy
examined in the last section.
In a relatively equal country, industrialization occurs and raises At. The e#ects of an
increase of At can be examined by di#erentiating the ﬁrst-order-conditions. The following
assumption is imposed to analyze this e#ect.
Assumption 1
v ()At	2{wL	wHf(ht	1)}/v ()1
This means that the measure of comparative risk aversion is small enough and intertemporal
substitution is large. Therefore, when At	2 rises and the return to education increases, the
optimal educational level of children ht increases under this assumption.
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and the educational level rises.
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These e#ects can be observed in ﬁgure 7 as an upward shift of the dynamics of yt as At
approaches the upper bound A A (Figure 7). The non-negativity constraint on consumption
becomes unbinding for more individuals, and more and more dynasties approach the high-level
equilibrium. As A A is assumed to satisfy wL c c
A A
, all the dynasties start to converge to the
high-level equilibrium as inﬁnite time passes.
In an unequal country where no manufacturing goods are produced, no learning-by-doing
occurs and the dynamics are completely described by ﬁgure 6. In this case, the growth occurs
only by the increase of Ht. Therefore, the growth rate is lower than that in an equal country
where industrialization takes place.
Next, examine how the income distribution changes as the economy grows. In an unequal
economy which completely specializes in agriculture, individuals become polarized into the
rich and the poor as shown in ﬁgure 6. Therefore, an originally unequal country becomes
unequal and poor.
In an equal economy, at ﬁrst polarization takes place. Some of the agents approach the
high-level equilibrium, while the rest move toward the low-level equilibrium. Next, as
c c
At
declines, more and more people become richer and educate their children. This further
increases their income and accelerates industrialization, until all people reach a high-education
and high-income equilibrium. In this process, inequality ﬁrst rises and then declines. Therefore,
there is a possibility that income distribution changes as the inverted-U hypothesis by Kuznets
(Kuznets 1955).
F><.7
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In this section, the implications of three government policies on economic growth and
welfare are considered. The policies are income redistribution, subsidy on education and
import tari#s.
1. The Optimal Income Redistribution Policy
It is interesting to analyze what kind of income redistribution favors economic growth.
For analytical purposes, assume that income follows a uniform distribution U[ms, ms].
Then, the variance of income is s
2/3 and the ratio of agents who can receive education is
msy ˆ /2s. Consider the welfare implications of a redistribution policy where the govern-










 y ˆ m
2s
2 (38)
indicates the following results.
When my ˆis satiﬁed (thus, in countries that are not extremely poor), the more equally
income is redistributed, the greater the number of agents who are able to receive an education.
This raises the level of human capital and the growth rate. This observation is consistent with
the ﬁndings that equal East Asian countries grew faster than unequal Latin American
countries after World War II.
In very poor countries with my ˆ , on the other hand, the more unequally income is
redistributed, the larger the number of agents who can receive education. This is because
everyone is too poor to educate his/her child if distribution is equal, but some rich can a#ord
education if distribution is unequal. Therefore, unequal redistribution raises the aggregate
human capital, growth rate and steady-state income level. This e#ect is particularly clear when
the country moves from complete specialization to incomplete specialization.
2. Subsidy to education
When the government gives subsidies to education and lowers the cost of education from
a to (1Y)a, the following e#ects on the optimal choice of agents can be observed. Assuming
incomplete specialization, the e#ects can be shown by comparative statics with di#erentiating
equations (14), (15) and (19) and evaluation of the derivative at Y0.













2u (At2 yt 2)At2wHf (ht1)
0
(39)
indicates that agents give more education to their children with the subsidy to education.
2003] >C8DB: 9>HIG>7JI>DC 6C9 BJAI>EA: :FJ>A>7G>6 21In case 2, from equation (19),
ht10
indicates that very poor agents are still unable to provide any education to their children, even
if education is subsidized.
As for










shows that the ratio of individuals who can receive education increases.
This e#ect can be observed as the upward shift of ht1(yt). Subsidy enables agents who are
originally unable to receive any education to gain more education, and increases the number
of agents who can receive education. As a whole economy, the level of education always rises,
thereby accelerating industrialization and raising the steady-state level of income.
3. Import Tari# on Manufactured goods
What are the welfare implications of trade policy? To clarify the results, examine this
















Assuming incomplete specialization, factor prices vary as domestic prices of manufactured
















When the tari# rate is denoted by TM, the assumption of a small country ensures dPMdTM.
These conditions make it possible to examine the e#ects of import tari# on the optimal choice
of education.
1






























Therefore, combining equations (39) and (40), the e#ects of import tari# on education is given
by
1 When domestic PM changes due to import tari#s, the price of composite good CtPMCMtPZCZt changes. In
this case, however, the Cobb-Douglas utility function ensures a constant expenditure share for Ct and At2 yt2y y,
and it is thus unnecessary to examine the e#ect of the change of PMt on education.








which is positive if g1/2 (dg0). This condition has the following implications.
When domestic PM rises due to import tari#, wH increases and wL decreases as the unit cost
curve of good M shifts to the right in ﬁgure 1 (Stolper-Samuelson Theorem). If g is small
enough and good Z is very unskilled labor intensive, wH increases largely and wL decreases only
slightly. In this case, parental income increases and this in turn raises the children’s educa-
tional level and income, because children’s income is assumed to be a normal good. Therefore,
if g1/2, the import tari# raises the educational level and human capital. This argument
shows that protecting an industry with externality such as manufacturing can accelerate
economic growth, even if at the time the country does not have a comparative advantage in
that particular industry (Infant industry).
The case with incomplete knowledge spillover from learning-by-doing can be analyzed in
the present context. If productivity in the manufacturing sector rises more than in the
agricultural sector, the unit cost curve of good M in ﬁgure 1 shifts to the right more than that
of good Z. Therefore, wH increases and wL decreases, which changes the educational level of
children. This e#ect on human capital and growth are the same as those triggered by an import
tari# on good M. Thus, in the case of incomplete knowledge spillover, learning-by-doing in the
manufacturing sector raises growth rates only when good Z is very unskilled labor intensive.
Conclusion
The post-war growth experiences of developing countries lead to the idea that income
equality may accelerate economic growth. In this paper, a theoretical model is used to show the
possibility that equality makes a country human-capital abundant, which in turn enables
industrialization and higher economic growth. In addition, the two-good framework is used to
illustrate the possibility that protecting infant industries with dynamic externality enhances
economic growth.
Two additional extensions will be addressed in future work. First, unequal distribution
may lower the economic growth rate through higher population growth. As shown in Barro
and Becker (1989) and Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990), if quantity and “quality” of
children are substitutes, poor households tend to have many children with low education.
Therefore, in an unequal economy with a large number of poor, the population growth rate
rises and the economy becomes more unskilled labor abundant, which further deters industri-
alization. The second issue to be tackled is whether the comparative advantage explanations
will pass a proper econometric investigation.
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